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  According to some Turkish officials, April 24th 
2010 was averted with no damage, since the US 
President Obama did not use that “magical” 
word; genocide. In reality, Obama talks of   
genocide without using the word. Meds 
Yeghern, meaning the Great Calamity, is a term 
synonymous with genocide for Armenians. 
 
  This brought to mind the future, or rather the 
ratification, of the Protocols, signed between 
Turkey and Armenia in 2009. The text of the   
Protocols ensure a compromise in terms of each 
country’s priorities. For Armenia, the opening of 
the border is the biggest issue, while for Turkey 
it is Armenia’s recognition of the mutual border 
and the establishment of a historical commission 
to investigate the Armenian question. The      
Protocols faced fierce criticism in both countries. 
In Armenia, those opposing the historical     
commission are against opening up the genocide  
for discussion at all. In addition, according to the 
Armenians objecting to the Protocols, the clause 
that refers to the establishment of diplomatic ties 
and reads “recognition of the border along     
international treaties” translates as an indirect 
recognition of the 1921 Kars Treaty. 
 
In Turkey, those opposing the Protocols focus on 
the same clauses. Some say that the lack of a real 
mention of the Kars Treaty is a big mistake, that 
it will mean for Turkey giving up its special    
observant (droit de regard) status on 
Nakhchivan, and that the historical commission 
will open up a bargain on the genocide question. 
And of course there is the objection that the    
Protocols cannot be ratified while Armenia’s   
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  Azerbaijan also made its move as the Protocols 
faced objections in Turkey. Ministers from the 
brother country, which was being continuously 
informed of the Turkish-Armenian negotiations, 
came to Turkey and almost became a part of the 
domestic politics. They acted out in ways that 
would have created an avert reaction in Turkey 
had Azerbaijan not been “the brother country”. 
AK Party officials and the Prime Minister were 
startled by the situation. Prime Minister Erdoğan 
went to Baku and gave guarantees that the     
Protocols would not be ratified before the       
Nagorno Karabakh conflict is resolved. In fact, 
the Prime Minister’s words were taking it a few 
steps further than the rhetoric and conceptions 
of the Foreign Ministry and Minister Davutoğlu. 
Up until then, Turkish governments were       
talking about certain steps to be taken towards 
the resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict in 
order to open the border, as Armenians and    
Azeris themselves had come to an                    
understanding to defer the solution of the     
problem. The core of the problem was the       
disagreement over whether a clause specifically 
referring to how the Karabakh issue would be 
resolved should be put in the text; Armenians 
want the word referendum mentioned, the      
Azeris object to this. Armenians refuse to     
withdraw from the occupied rayons as long as 
the method of resolution remains undecided. 
 
  Turkey’s condition that the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict should be resolved in order for the    
Protocols to be ratified got a negative reaction 
from Armenia. Those who objected to the       
Protocols in Turkey criticized the absence of this 
subject in the text. In fact, it is not common to 
put an issue having to do with a third country in 
these kinds of Protocols. The three co-chairs of 
the Minsk Group, the US, France and Russia, 
stressed that the ratification of the Protocols 
should not be tied to any conditions and thus 
indirectly criticized Turkey’s attitude. What 
caused this limp? During the Yerevan visit      
organized by the Global Political Trends Center 
of Istanbul Kültür University, Armenian officials 
told the Turkish delegation that during the     
negotiations, the Turkish side did not mention 
the resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. 
Instead the Armenian side brought up the    
question of how the conflict will be managed in 
the process, and they were told that the problem 
was already solved at the highest level. The    
officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, on 
the other hand, claim the opposite; that the   
problem was brought up by the Turkish side. 
There is thus a serious uncertainty, while the 
Swiss side that chaired the negotiations remains 
silent. There are then three possibilities here:  
 
A. The Turkish side did bring up the subject 
during negotiations, but not as a             
precondition for ratification. 
 
B. The Turkish side, as Armenians claim, did 
not bring up the subject.  
 
C.  The reason being that the co-chairs of the 
 Minsk Group gave guarantees for         
 progress on the resolution of the                 
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  For a while now the co-chairs of the Minsk 
Group have made it a tradition to make           
optimistic statements on the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict. Statements such as the conflict being 
95% solved have been abounding. In                 
international relations, “the devil is in the        
details.” The most sensitive part of the issue is 
that 5% that remains to be solved. 
 
  In addition to this stumbling block before     
ratification, the Turkish side claimed the          
decision by the Armenian Constitutional Court 
confirming the compatibility of the Protocols 
with the Armenian Constitution also cast a 
shadow over the Protocols. The Court’s 6-page 
conviction mainly stated that the Protocols could 
not be interpreted as to contradict the preamble 
of the Armenian Constitution or Article 11 of the 
Declaration of Independence. In other words, it 
is stressed that Armenia would not give up on 
the idea of, or the work towards, “having the 
Armenian Genocide, including in Western      
Armenia, recognized by the international       
community”. The message is that the historical 
sub-commission envisaged by the Protocols   
cannot be interpreted as having given up on 
genocide recognition. It is assumed that it will 
not be easy for Turkey to convincingly argue on 
the international stage that this decision by the 
Court cast a shadow over the Protocols. Indeed, 
it is more significant that President Sargsyan 
said in an interview he gave to the Russian      
media that the committee would not discuss the 
genocide, but rather the consequences of the 
genocide. Those who oppose the Protocols put a 
similar claim forward in Turkey. The relevant 
provision of the Protocol mentions “dialogue 
towards establishing mutual trust between the 
two peoples, including a scientific and objective 
investigation of historical documents and        
archives.” In this regard, Sargsyan’s statement 
does not conform to the text, but shows how    
Armenia interprets this provision. 
  The stall in the ratification process in Turkey 
prompted action on the Armenian side as well. 
First, legislation was passed that allowed the 
government to withdraw their signatures from 
the Protocols. Later the President announced 
that the Protocols were suspended and Armenia 
would not take action until Turkey ratified them. 
Thus Armenia leveled up with Turkey in terms 
of ratification. If Armenia wanted to put Turkey 
in a difficult position internationally, it would 
ratify the Protocols and shift the pressure        
towards Turkey. The content of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s meeting with Sargsyan in Washington 
DC in April during the Nuclear Summit is       
unknown, but it is presumed that his statements 
that Turkey is behind the process and the        
signatures impeded Armenia’s tendency to 
withdraw from the process. The remarks      
President Sargsyan made when he announced 
the suspension of the process on President Gül’s 
political honesty could evoke an important     
subject. Turkey was not the party to bring up 
Karabakh during the Turkish-Armenian          
negotiation process, as President Gül had not 
made any statements implying the ratification 
process was conditional on another issue either. 
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  The Protocols serve an important function in 
the normalization of relations. It would not only 
be wrong to give up the process, but that would 
also make it even harder to restart in the future. 
The opening of the border might not mean as 
much to the Armenian economy as it did in 
early 1990s. Still, the opening of this door would 
both allow Armenia to breath better and also be 
perceived there as a moral victory against 
Azerbaijan. 
 
  For Turkey, keeping the border closed is an 
anomaly. However, an equally important issue 
for Turkey is the desire to curb Armenia’s 
international campaign for genocide recognition. 
To counter this campaign Turkey would try to 
use both the historical sub-commission and the 
article on “avoiding policies that are not 
coherent with good neighborly relations” in the 
Protocol on Building Diplomatic Relations. It is 
important that the historical sub-commission is 
established. In fact, President Clinton had 
pointed to a history commission against the 
genocide campaign. In reality a history 
commission on genocide would conduce to a 
document exchange, like it was done through 
the University of Vienna in 2004. Arriving at a 
decision regarding the genocide would be the 
task of an international court, which the 1948 
Charter points to as well. A historical 
commission cannot take such a decision. The 
Armenian side would say they are discussing 
the genocide through the commission, while the 
Turkish side would be sending the message that 
documents are being investigated in a scientific 
and objective manner. 
 
 
 The process of normalization in                     
Turkish-Armenian relations is shelved for now. 
But it is not dead. There are a number of          
possibilities in this area that could keep the    
process alive to an extent, even if the Protocols 
are not ratified. 
 
The Minsk Group:  
 The three co-chairs should put more effort in 
solving the conflict. Specifically, Russia should 
not view the conflict solely from the perspective 
of energy corridors. It is apparent that Russia 
would like to tie the solution of the conflict to 
shaping its energy    issues in its favor. The       
occupation is as much of an anomaly as the 
Turkish-Armenian border   being closed. There 
is the impression that the idea in 1990s of       
solving the conflict in accordance with          
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity has shifted     
towards the region being integrated to Armenia. 
Azerbaijan’s idea to solve the conflict with arms 
is faulty and would cause   larger problems. For 
the Madrid Principles to be implemented, the 
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 Turkey:  
 Even though the Protocols remain not ratified, 
there are steps that could be taken without 
having to wait for ratification. As foreseen in the 
Protocols, establishing dialogue between the 
Foreign Ministries of both countries, student and 
specialist exchange in the fields of science and 
education are the principal among those steps. 
The Protocols do not have to ratified to do these. 
Moreover, protecting and improving Turkey’s 
Armenian heritage and culture is something that 
needs to be done regardless of the Protocols. In 
addition, there are many steps that could be 
taken with neighboring Armenia in the field of 
culture, including TV programs. Building close 
dialogue among the two people with assistance 
from civil society organization is essential for the 




 Expecting Armenia to give up the genocide idea 
is unrealistic. Nonetheless, it is possible for 
Armenia to act more carefully even when 
pursuing this idea. Vilifying Turkey everyday 
cannot be very beneficial. It would also prevent 
a rapprochement between the two people. 
Armenia should not push aside the 
“constructive ambiguity” formula in regards to 
implementing the Madrid Principles within the 
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Azerbaijan:  
  The leaders of this brother country, who are 
informed on the Turkish-Armenian negotiation 
process, are expected to be more careful in their 
remarks concerning Turkey. Threatening, 
screaming and playing the Russia card may 
seem profitable in the short run, but still cause 
unforeseen damages. Since the Armenian 
occupation has gone on for the past 15 years 
despite the border being closed, the border has 
ceased to be a factor in the solution of the 
Armenian-Azeri dispute. Just as the annulment 
of Karabakh’s status had been wrong in the 
beginning, a new military operation might 
complicate matters even further. 
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